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Department of Psychology, LaMarsh Centre for Child and Youth Research, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
Temporal discounting is the tendency to devalue temporally distant rewards. Past
studies have examined the k-value, the indifference point, and the area under the curve
as dependent measures on this task. The current study included these three measures
and a fourth measure, called the interest rate total score, which differentiated good
from poor choices. The interest rate total score was based on scoring only those items
in which the delayed choice should be preferred given the expected return based on
simple interest rates. In addition, associations with several individual difference measures
were examined including intelligence, executive functions (inhibition, working memory,
and set-shifting), thinking dispositions [Need for Cognition and Consideration of Future
Consequences (CFCs)] and engagement in substance use and gambling behavior. A
staircase temporal discounting task was examined in a sample of 99 university students.
Replicating previous studies, temporal discounting increased with longer delays to
reward and decreased with higher reward magnitudes. A hyperbolic function accounted
for more variance in temporal discounting than an exponential function. Reaction time
at the indifference point was significantly longer than at the other choice points. The
four dependent measures of temporal discounting were all significantly correlated and
were also significantly associated with our individual difference measures. That is, the
tendency to wait for a larger delayed reward on all of the temporal discounting measures
was associated with higher intelligence, higher executive functions, and more CFCs.
Associations between our measures of temporal discounting and outcomes related to
substance use and gambling behavior were modest in our university sample.
Keywords: temporal discounting, rational thinking, decision-making, intelligence, executive functions, thinking
dispositions, behavioral outcomes
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Introduction
Temporal discounting refers to the tendency to discount rewards
that are temporally distant, where there is a weakening of
the eﬀects of value due to temporal delay (Critchﬁeld and
Kollins, 2001). Temporal discounting, also known as delay
discounting, has become an index of self-control and willpower
(Ainslie, 2001, 2003; Shamosh and Gray, 2008). It is a signiﬁcant
construct that has been conceptualized as prudently discounting
the future in models of rational thinking and decision-making
(Stanovich, 2009, 2011; Stanovich et al., 2011). There are several
methodological considerations in the measurement of temporal
discounting that spans across diﬀerent literatures, including
psychophysical methods (Mazur, 1987; Myerson et al., 2003)
and adapted methods that have been used in the judgment
and decision-making literature (Hardisty et al., 2013). The key
dependent measures that have been examined in the temporal
discounting literature are the k-value, area under the curve,
and the indiﬀerence point. Given that temporal discounting has
been conceptualized as a component of instrumental rationality
(Stanovich, 2009, 2011), we included one additional indicator
called the interest rate score, based on a scoring scheme that
diﬀerentiated better from poorer choices. Our purpose was to
examine whether these four temporal discounting measures
would be signiﬁcantly associated. In addition, we included
individual diﬀerence measures of cognitive abilities (intelligence
and executive functions) and thinking dispositions as further
measures to examine convergence. Finally, we included a
measure of behavioral outcomes to assess the association between
temporal discounting and drug use and gambling behavior.
Temporal discounting is an important construct that has been
identiﬁed across several literatures, and this study contributes to
our understanding of optimal ways to assess this construct with
the use of a single indicator.
Temporal Discounting
Temporal discounting tasks generally require participants to
make choices between a small variable reward available
immediately versus a larger constant reward available after a
variable delay (Rachlin et al., 1991). These types of tasks have also
been referred to as intertemporal choice and delay discounting,
and sometimes even delay of gratiﬁcation (Shamosh and Gray,
2008). However, some researchers in the judgment and decision-
making ﬁeld have made more nuanced distinctions between
various considerations that underlie these choices, such as factors
that diminish the expected utility of a future consequence (time
discounting) and considerations that may lead to preference
for immediate utility over delayed utility (time preference;
Frederick et al., 2002). In this study, we focused on single
indicators of performance on typical choice tasks, also called the
“commitment-choice” procedure, which requires the individual
to commit to an immediate or delayed reward on several diﬀerent
trials (Frederick et al., 2002; Reynolds and Schiﬀbauer, 2005).
In temporal discounting tasks, there is an indiﬀerence point,
where the participant will switch from preferring the immediate
reward to the delayed reward. The indiﬀerence point represents
the subjective value of the reward for the participant because
it is the amount preferred (which will vary by participant) and
is usually less than the face value of the larger delayed reward
(Critchﬁeld and Kollins, 2001). The data from this task can
be represented graphically with the current subjective value of
the reward on the y-axis and the delay on the x-axis. Figure 1
contains hypothetical data from two participants to illustrate two
diﬀerent choice architectures.
The data in Figure 1 can be represented by a hyperbolic or an
exponential equation (Mazur, 1987):
Hyperbolic : V = A
1 + kD
Exponential : V = Ae−kD
A, V, and D represent the amount, subjective value, and delay
respectively. Variables in the exponential equation represent the
same values as those in the hyperbolic equation and e represents
Euler’s number and is also at the base of the natural logarithm.
A k-value can be derived, which represents an individual ﬁtted
parameter that can be thought of as sensitivity to delay. When
the value of k is small, the individual is less sensitive to delay,
and shows less discounting in response to it (a less steep curve,
denoted by the stars in Figure 1). However, when the value of
k is large, it means that the individual is very sensitive to the
delay period, and this translates to higher rates of discounting
in response to delay (a steep curve, denoted by the triangles in
Figure 1). Indeed, much research involving temporal discounting
data has found that the data is ﬁt best with the hyperbolic
equation, as opposed to the exponential equation (Rachlin et al.,
1991; Green et al., 1997; Ainslie, 2001; Johnson and Bickel, 2002;
Myerson et al., 2003; Robles and Vargas, 2007; Steinberg et al.,
2009), meaning that individuals were discounting at a negatively
accelerating rate. In order to measure people’s choice architecture
in temporal discounting paradigms, the k-value is commonly
used (Mazur, 1987).
The area under the curve is an additional dependent measure
that is calculated by normalizing each delay and subjective value
FIGURE 1 | Hypothetical temporal discounting data illustrating
indifference point choices, based on Critchfield and Kollins (2001).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 728
Basile and Toplak Temporal discounting and individual differences
for each data point (Myerson et al., 2001). As noted by Myerson
et al. (2001), since the area is calculated by the actual data
points, there are no theoretical assumptions inherent in the area
under the curve measure. The indiﬀerence point (V ; Critchﬁeld
and Kollins, 2001) indicates when the participant switched from
preferring the immediate reward to the delayed reward. For
example, a participant may choose to wait 1 month for $100 over
$50 now, but when given the choice between $60 now or $100
in 1 month, the participant may choose $60 now. This would
indicate that $60 now is the indiﬀerence point or the subjective
value of the delayed reward. All three of these commonly used
measures to assess temporal discounting were examined in the
present study. We tested whether a hyperbolic or exponential
curve would provide a better ﬁt of our data.
The hyperbolic function used to account for temporal
discounting choices shows that discounting rates are not constant
over time and appear to decline (Frederick et al., 2002). Indeed,
length of delay has been identiﬁed as a critical variable. Green
et al. (1997) found that the amount of the immediate reward
that is subjectively equivalent to the later reward decreased with
delay. Therefore, as delay increased, subjective value of a reward
decreased. As time to reward increased, the reward itself is judged
to be equivalent to smaller and smaller rewards. This ﬁnding was
also supported by Steinberg et al. (2009) who demonstrated that
the indiﬀerence point declines as the delay interval increases.
The longer one has to wait for a reward, the less value that
reward holds in comparison to the immediate reward being
oﬀered.
The rate at which the value of a delayed reward is discounted
also depends on the magnitude or size of that reward. Green
et al. (1997) reported that the delayed reward decreased in a
negatively accelerating fashion as the amount of the reward
increased from $100 to $25,000, but no diﬀerences in discounting
were observed from $25,000 to $100,000. These ﬁndings provided
evidence to suggest that the rate of discounting decreases with
increases in the amount of delayed reward, up to a certain
point (as measured by the k parameter). In other words, with
increasing reward value, delay discounting tends to decrease.
These results are consistent with Myerson et al. (2003) who
found that smaller delayed amounts were discounted more
steeply than larger delayed amounts. We included ﬁve periods
of delay and two diﬀerent reward magnitudes in the current
study to test for the eﬀects of period of delay and size of reward
magnitude.
All of the measures of temporal discounting discussed
thus far do not diﬀerentiate better from poorer choices in the
calculation of the dependent variable. Temporal discounting can
be conceptualized as a component of instrumental rationality,
pertaining to an individual’s goal fulﬁllment (Stanovich,
2011). Temporal discounting, however, is a theoretically
complex construct (Frederick, 2006), and some choices may be
characterized as better decisions than others. While there are
many contextual factors that can impact the immediate versus
delayed choice, some of these choices are arguably better than
others. In Aesop’s classic fable of the grasshopper and the ant,
the ant maximized its individual goal fulﬁllment by toiling away
to put food away for the winter, while the grasshopper wasted
the opportunity to put away food and instead basked in the nice
weather, only to ﬁnd itself hungry once the winter season arrived
(McClure et al., 2004). This fable has been used to characterize
temporal discounting and it would be diﬃcult to dispute that the
ant made better judgments than the grasshopper.
In order to diﬀerentiate better from poorer choices, another
way to assess temporal discounting is from the perspective of
market interest rates (Senecal et al., 2012). For example, if oﬀered
$20 now versus $100 in 5 years, and $90 now and $100 in
5 years, the delayed choice in the former is a better option than
the delayed choice in the latter. Indeed, the former provides
an 80% annual rate of return based on a calculation of simple
interest rates, and the latter provides a 2% rate of return. Another
potential measure to index temporal discounting is to derive a
score that only includes items in which the choice to wait for
the larger delayed reward is arguably the best option. From the
perspective of simple interest rates, the estimate of an annual
interest rate could arguably be used to separate choices where
one should wait relative to the remaining choices. For example,
Frederick (2005) found that a ﬁve-item time preference test
that credited participants with selecting the delayed later choice
was signiﬁcantly associated with performance on the cognitive
reﬂection test and his ﬁnding also was replicated by Toplak
et al. (2014). All of these ﬁve items on this time preference
test would have translated into at least a 40% increase based
on a simple interest rate basis. To this end, we scored only
a subset of the temporal discounting items. In particular, we
selected a 40% cut-oﬀ, a rate of return that would clearly
reﬂect a poor judgment or decision to pass up. We credited
participants if they made the delayed choice when a calculation
of an annual interest rate was at or above a 40% rate of
return. This was our fourth indicator of temporal discounting,
which we called the interest rate total score. We characterized
this measure as an indicator of decision-making given that we
diﬀerentiate poor from better choices in the scoring of this
task. Temporal discounting has been included in taxonomies of
rational thinking and decision-making (Stanovich, 2009, 2011;
Stanovich et al., 2011).We expected the ﬁndings from the interest
rate total score to converge with the other indicators of temporal
discounting.
If the shift from the immediate option to the larger delayed
option involves an override of a default in favor of longer term
optimization, then we may also expect diﬀerences in reaction
time on the indiﬀerence point selection compared to other
selections. Robles and Vargas (2007) reported signiﬁcant peaks
in reaction time at the ﬁrst trial and at or about the indiﬀerence
trial on a temporal discounting task that was administered
using ascending and descending orders. We predicted that the
reaction time would be highest at the indiﬀerence point relative
to all of the other trials, given that this requires additional
consideration in order to override the default choices on this
task.
Individual Differences and Temporal
Discounting
Why are some people more willing to wait for large delayed
rewards while others prefer smaller, more immediate, rewards?
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One common explanation has been cognitive abilities. Shamosh
and Gray (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of the relationship
between temporal discounting and intelligence. These authors
found that people with higher intelligence displayed lower delay
discounting or less sensitivity to delay periods. Steinberg et al.
(2009) also found that indiﬀerence points were positively related
to intelligence. Namely, participants with higher intelligence
scores were more willing to wait for a larger delayed
reward.
Executive functions are another domain of cognitive abilities
that have been examined as a correlate of temporal discounting.
Executive functions are typically assessed using measures
of inhibition, working memory, and set-shifting (or mental
ﬂexibility). Inhibition refers to the ability to stop a prepotent
response, working memory refers to holding facts in mind
while manipulating information, and set-shifting refers to
the ability to display ﬂexibility when there are changing
rules/schedules of reinforcement in the environment (Miyake
et al., 2000). The ﬁndings on the association between temporal
discounting and executive functions have been somewhat mixed.
Shamosh et al. (2008) reported a signiﬁcant relationship between
temporal discounting and working memory in a sample of
university students. However, Steinberg et al. (2009) did not
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association between temporal discounting and
executive functions in their large sample spanning 10–30 year-
olds. In another study using a developmental sample, inhibition
was also not found to be associated with delay discounting
(Lamm et al., 2006).
Thinking dispositions are another separable domain from
intelligence and executive functions that have been associated
with rational thinking and decision-making (Stanovich, 2011).
Thinking dispositions assess people’s propensities or tendencies
that can facilitate reﬂective judgments. Individual diﬀerences
in certain types of thinking dispositions have been shown to
predict performance on decision-making tasks independently of
cognitive abilities (Stanovich, 2009, 2011). Steinberg et al. (2009)
examined age diﬀerences in the self-reported tendency toward
future orientation in a sample of 10 to 30-year-olds. Individuals
younger than age 16 had a lower orientation to the future and
also accepted smaller, more immediate rewards, as opposed to
larger delayed ones. We examined two thinking dispositions that
we expected would be associated with temporal discounting:
persistence in thinking (the Need for Cognition Scale: Cacioppo
et al., 1996) and the Consideration of Future Consequences
(CFCs) Scale (Strathman et al., 1994). These dispositions have
been associated with better rational thinking performance in
other studies (Toplak et al., 2007; West et al., 2008), and thus we
expected that endorsement of persistence in thinking and higher
CFCs would be associated withmore delayed choices on temporal
discounting.
Associations between Behavioral Outcomes
and Temporal Discounting
There is a sizable literature to suggest that temporal discounting
is associated with more risky behavior. Temporal discounting
studies have shown that cigarette smokers (Bickel et al., 1999),
substance abusers with gambling problems (Petry and Casarella,
1999) and heroin addicts (Kirby et al., 1999) discount the
value of delayed rewards at a higher rate than do control
groups. Moreover, ﬁscal responsibility and credit card debt
have been shown to be associated with low levels of CFCs
and high levels of temporal discounting (Joireman et al.,
2005). We examined substance use and gambling behavior
in association with temporal discounting in the current
study.
Hypotheses
In this study, we examined four diﬀerent dependent measures
to assess temporal discounting choices: the indiﬀerence point,
k-values, area under the curve, and an additional variable
termed the interest rate total score. We expected that temporal
discounting choices would be better represented by a hyperbolic
than exponential curve (Rachlin et al., 1991; Green et al., 1997;
Johnson and Bickel, 2002; Myerson et al., 2003; Robles and
Vargas, 2007; Steinberg et al., 2009). We expected signiﬁcant
associations between the four indicators of temporal discounting
and that reaction times would be higher at the indiﬀerence point
selection than at the other choices. The preference for a larger
delayed reward was also expected to be signiﬁcantly associated
with higher cognitive abilities, dispositional tendencies toward
more persistence in thinking and CFCs, and less substance use
and gambling behavior.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The ﬁnal sample consisted of 99 participants (37 males and 62
females) from an undergraduate university sample. The mean
age of the sample was 20.72 years (SD = 2.36, range = 18–
30 years of age). Participants were recruited on a university
campus, and each volunteer received $15 for 1 h of participation.
As inclusion criteria, participants were required to have English
as a ﬁrst language or have been schooled in English and
must have spoken English for at least 10 years. First year
undergraduate students comprised 29.3% of the sample, 32.3%
were second year undergraduates, 12.1% were third year
undergraduates, 18.2% were fourth year undergraduates, and 8%
had graduated or were post-undergraduate continuing education
students.
Measures
Temporal Discounting Task
A staircase version of a temporal discounting choice task adapted
from Rachlin et al. (1991) was used in this study. This task
was administered on a computer using the program Media Lab.
This task involved making several hypothetical choices between
an immediate reward and a delayed ﬁxed reward. There were
ﬁve delay periods (1 month, 1, 5, 10, and 25 years) crossed
with two reward magnitudes ($100 and $10,000), both within-
subject factors. The immediate variable reward changed in a
sequential staircase manner by factors of 10. For example, in the
$100 reward magnitude block, the immediate reward changed
by $10 increments ($10, $20, $30, $40, $50, $60, $70, $80, $90,
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and $100). Each participant made a total of 100 choices (2
reward magnitudes × 5 delay periods × 10 trials at each reward
magnitude and delay period)1. For the temporal discounting task,
our criteria to determine the indiﬀerence point was a switch
followed by two consistent choices after the switch (based on
Hurst et al., 2010). We did not identify any non-systematic
responders on the temporal discounting task. It should also
be noted that the participants were individually tested with an
experimenter, and the experimenter would have clariﬁed any
unusual responding during the testing session. The reaction
time for each choice in the temporal discounting task was also
collected.
Four sets of dependent variables were derived from this task.
First, the temporal discounting task had a k-value, an individual
ﬁtted parameter that can be thought of as sensitivity to delay.
When the value of k is small, the individual is less sensitive to
delay, and shows less discounting in response to delay. When
the value of k is large, it means that the individual is very
sensitive to the delay period, and this translates to higher rates
of discounting in response to delay. Since k-values represent
a rate of discounting over time, they can only be calculated
for each reward magnitude and not individual delay periods.
There were three k-value dependent measures on this task: the
mean k-value at the $100 reward magnitude, the mean k-value
at the $10,000 reward magnitude, and the mean k-value across
reward magnitudes (correlation across two magnitudes, r = 0.46,
p< 0.0001). The k-values were skewed and not normal and could
not be statistically transformed. A smaller k-value was associated
with less discounting and a preference to wait for larger delayed
reward.
The area under the curve was calculated by normalizing
each delay and subjective value for each data point (Myerson
et al., 2001). This was accomplished by making the delay
and subjective values proportions of the maximum delay and
maximum subjective values. The normalized values were then
used as x (period of delay) and y (mean indiﬀerence point)
coordinates to construct a graph of the discounting data. Vertical
lines were drawn under each of the data points to the x-axis
creating a series of trapezoids. The area of each of the trapezoids
was equal to (x2 – x1)[(y1 + y2)/2]. The values of x were
the successive delays and the y-values were the subjective
values associated with each delay (note the ﬁrst trapezoid had
an x1 and y1 deﬁned by 0.0 and 1.0). The area under the
discounting function was equal to the sum of the areas of these
trapezoids. Since all the values are normalized, the area under
the curve can vary between 0 (steepest discounting) and 1 (no
1The typical administration of this task involves administering each set of trials in
ascending and descending order. Administering both ascending and descending
order to each participant would have doubled the number of trials, thus ascending
versus descending order was treated as a between-subject manipulation to limit the
number of trials to 100 for each participant. Thus, half of the participants received
the trials in descending order and half received the trials in ascending order. An
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the indiﬀerence point for
each order. Only one of the 10 analyses was signiﬁcant, indicating that indiﬀerence
points were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across ascending and descending versions.
Thus, the choices from each order were collapsed for the analyses. Robles and
Vargas (2007) also found no diﬀerences in the degree of discounting between
ascending and descending procedures.
discounting). There were 13 dependent measures available for
the area of the curve dependent measure: an estimate at each
delay period by reward magnitude (10 values), an estimate at
each reward magnitude (two values; correlation across these
two reward magnitudes was r = 0.62, p < 0.0001), and an
overall mean estimate. The steeper the function, the less area
that is under the curve. Therefore, smaller areas under the
curve represented more discounting and a preference for small
immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards. Larger areas
under the curve represented less discounting and a preference to
wait for large delayed rewards over small immediate ones. The
area under the curve measures were highly skewed and could not
be normalized.
The third set of dependent measures from this task was the
mean indiﬀerence point at each of the ﬁve delay periods within
each of the two reward magnitudes. An overall mean indiﬀerence
point was also derived for each of the two reward magnitudes,
and an average indiﬀerence point was derived based on summing
standardized z-scores of the mean indiﬀerence points at each
reward magnitude (correlation across two reward magnitudes,
r = 0.68, p < 0.0001), resulting in 13 indiﬀerence point
scores. The overall mean score was normally distributed. The
indiﬀerence points were also used for the curve ﬁtting analyses.
A larger overall indiﬀerence point represents a preference to
wait for a larger delayed reward over a smaller immediate
reward.
The fourth measure, the interest rate total score, was based
on selecting items that met a cut-oﬀ in terms of simple rate
of return on an annual basis. The simple rate of return was
calculated for each of the 100 trials, and those items that were
at 40% or higher were selected to derive these scores. Selecting
a cut-oﬀ this high also makes salient the poor judgment to
decline this return2. We examined the data to determine the
frequencies of now versus later choices, and we decided based
on a yearly interest rate that would denote variability between
responders for each choice across each delay period and within
each amount of delay. Speciﬁcally, at the $100 amount across
the diﬀerent delays, 31–97% of responders chose to wait, and
at the $10000 amount across the diﬀerent delays, 51–97% of
responders chose to wait. We determined that a 40% cut-oﬀ
would permit inclusion of at least one item from each set of
choices with some variability in the proportion of now versus
later choices, with the exception of the 25 years delay period.
On these items, participants were credited with one point for
choosing the delayed option. Participants received a score of 0
if they chose the now option on such an item. For the 1 month
choices, nine out of 10 items met this cut-oﬀ. For the 1 year
2We realize that this cut-oﬀ was high, given that the interest rates have hovered
below 5% over the last 10 years in severalWestern countries (USA: 2.07%; Canada:
1.75%; Britain: 1.85% based on 10-years government bonds; The Economist, 2014).
However, it is important to also note the context of this task. The actual items
selected for this task were based on previously published studies of items that have
been used for staircase temporal discounting tasks. The interest rates of return
ranged from 1 to 10800%, which is a range that people would never experience in
their everyday lives. In the context of this task, participants would be contrasting
choices that vary substantially in terms of the potential amount gained within this
task. Likely as a result of the context of this task, there was no discrimination
between people’s choices at 5%, because almost everyone chose now.
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choices, seven out of 10 items met this cut-oﬀ; for the 5 years
choices, three out of 10 items met this cut-oﬀ; for the 10 years
choices, two out of 10 items met this cut-oﬀ; and no items met
this cut-oﬀ for the 25 years period of delay. This yielded a total
of 11 interest rate scores: eight scores for each delay period at
each reward magnitude, two overall total scores for each reward
magnitude (r = 0.72, p < 0.0001) and an overall total based on
all 42 items. The interest rate score was skewed and could not be
statistically transformed. A higher score indicated better choices
on this index.
For the reaction time data, an outlier analysis was conducted
with the reaction time scores on the temporal discounting
task; no outliers were identiﬁed. Mean reaction time on
the switch point trial was compared with the mean of the
remaining trials in each block. Reaction time comparisons were
available for each delay period at each amount of reward
level.
Intellectual Ability and Executive Function
Measures
Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI;
Wechsler, 1999)
The Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests from the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (WASI) were used.
The Vocabulary subtest was used as an estimate of verbal ability.
The Matrix Reasoning was used as an estimate of non-verbal
ability. The estimated full-scale mean score based on age norms
for the sample was 106.84 (SD = 10.81, range: 82–130). The
mean raw score on the Vocabulary subtest was 58.75 (SD = 7.3,
range = 32–73), and the mean raw score of the Matrix Reasoning
subtest was 27.24 (SD = 3.89, range = 17–33). The raw scores for
the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests were converted
into z-scores and summed to create a composite measure of
intellectual ability that was not relativized to age; this score was
used in the analyses. A higher score indicated higher intellectual
ability.
Executive Function Composite
Three measures were used to index executive functions: the
Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935), the Trail Making Test (Reitan,
1958), and the Paced Serial Addition Task (PASAT; Gronwall,
1977).
The Stroop Test was used to assess interference control, a type
of inhibition (Friedman and Miyake, 2004). Interference control
refers to the ability to ﬁlter out irrelevant information and to
select relevant information. There were three diﬀerent conditions
in the Stroop Test: a word reading condition, a color naming
condition, and an interference condition. For each condition,
participants had a practice trial prior to the actual trial. In
the word reading condition, participants were presented with
a chart of 48 words that named four colors (red, green, blue,
yellow) presented in a matrix of six columns and eight rows.
Participants were asked to read the words as quickly as possible
without making any errors. In the color naming condition,
participants were presented with a chart of 48 patches of color
(red, green, blue, yellow) presented in a matrix of six colors
and eight rows. Participants were asked to name the colors as
quickly as possible without making any errors. In the interference
condition, participants were presented with a chart of 48 words
presented in a matrix of six columns and eight rows. In this
condition, the color naming words (red, green, blue, yellow)
appeared in a diﬀerent color (red, green, blue, yellow) than the
color the word named. For example, the word “red” appeared
in the color yellow. Participants were asked to name the color as
quickly as possible without making any errors. The interference
condition was the most diﬃcult of the three conditions, as
participants needed to inhibit the competing modality, that is,
naming the words. The dependent measure was the total naming
time for the interference condition minus the total naming time
for the color naming condition (Strauss et al., 2006). The mean
interference score was 19.13 (SD = 7.09, range = 1.98–40.01).
The scores were transformed to z-scores. The z-scores were
reﬂected so that higher scores indicated better ability to inhibit
(less interference).
The Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1958) consisted of two parts,
Part A and Part B. Participants completed practice items for
both Part A and Part B. Part A required participants to connect
with a pencil line 25 numbered circles in numeric order. Part
B consisted of 13 numbered and 12 lettered circles, and the
participant was instructed to alternate between letters (i.e., 1 to
A, A to 2, 2 to B) until all of the circled numbers and letters
were exhausted. The dependentmeasure was the total completion
time on Part B, as this part of the task required participants to
“shift set” between numbers and letters. Mean completion time
was 57.28 s (SD = 18.61 s, range = 22.78–115.75). Reaction time
was signiﬁcantly skewed and a square root transformation was
used. The scores were transformed to z-scores, and these scores
were reﬂected so that higher scores indicated better set-shifting
ability.
The PASAT (Gronwall, 1977) was used as a measure of
working memory. It is a serial-addition task used to assess
capacity and rate of information processing, and sustained
and divided attention (Spreen and Strauss, 1998). It has been
conceptualized as a measure of working memory that relies on
attentional capacity and processing speed (Gonzalez et al., 2006).
In this task, a computer was used to serially present single
digits at a rate of every 3 s (Trial 1) and every 2 s (Trial 2).
A practice trial preceded each of the actual trials. In each trial,
the participant added each new digit to the one immediately
prior to it. The percent correct from each trial was averaged
across both trials. The mean overall percent correct was 68.26%
(SD = 0.17, range = 0.33 to 0.97). The overall percent correct
score was transformed into a z-score. A higher score indicated
better performance.
An executive function composite was calculated by summing
the z-scores of the three tasks. All of these measures were
signiﬁcantly correlated with each other (r = 0.31, p < 0.01 to
r = 0.42, p < 0.0001). A higher score indicated better executive
function performance.
Thinking Dispositions
Dispositions were measured using two diﬀerent scales,
intermixed in a single questionnaire: the Need for Cognition
Scale and the CFCs Scale. The response format for each item in
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the questionnaire was: Strongly Agree (6), Moderately Agree (5),
Slightly Agree (4), Slightly Disagree (3), Moderately Disagree (2),
and Strongly Disagree (1).
Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo et al., 1996)
The 18-item Need for Cognition Scale was used in this study.
Sample items include: “The notion of thinking abstractly is
appealing to me,” and “I would prefer a task that is intellectual,
diﬃcult, and important to one that is somewhat important but
does not require much thought.” The mean score on this scale
was 70.73 (SD = 12.87, range = 40–90). The Cronbach’s alpha
on this scale was 0.86. Higher scores on the scale indicate more
persistence and engagement in thinking.
Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (CFC;
Strathman et al., 1994)
The CFC is a 12-item scale that measures the extent to which
individuals consider distant outcomes when choosing their
present behavior. A sample item from the scale is: “I only
act to satisfy immediate concerns, ﬁguring the future will take
care of itself ” (reverse scored). The mean score on this scale
was 50.51 (SD = 8.29, range = 30–71). The Cronbach’s alpha
on this scale was 0.79. Higher scores indicate more CFCs of
behaviors.
Behavioral Correlates Related to Negative
Outcomes
Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI; Ferris and
Wynne, 2001)
The PGSI consists of nine items that asked participants to rate the
frequency of gambling related behavior in the past 12 months.
Items consisted of questions such as: “Have you bet more than
you could really aﬀord to lose?” and “Has your gambling caused
any ﬁnancial problems for you or your household?” Participants
were asked to rate the frequency of such items on a scale of Never
(1), Sometimes (2), Most of the time (3), and Almost Always
(4). There were two outliers in the data that were winsorized.
Higher scores on the PGSI indicated a greater risk of gambling
behavior.
Drug and Alcohol Problem Reporting
Each participant made ratings on a series of four questions to
determine if drinking alcohol and using drugs creates problems
for the individual. The items were: (1) Drinking alcohol is a
problem for me, (2) Drinking alcohol has created problems
between me and my partners and friends, (3) Doing illegal drugs
is a problem for me, and (4) Doing illegal drugs has created
problems between me and my partners and friends. Each of
these statements was rated on a scale of: Strongly Disagree (1),
Moderately Disagree (2), Slightly Disagree (3), Slightly Agree
(4), Moderately Agree (5), and Strongly Agree (6). Higher
scores indicated more problems associated with drug and alcohol
use.
Our sample was relatively low risk, endorsing little
gambling (M = 9.68, SD = 1.88, with a potential range of
scores between 4 and 36) and drug and alcohol behaviors
(M = 6.28, SD = 3.83, with a potential range of 4–24).
These two measures were signiﬁcantly correlated, r = 0.49,
p < 0.0001, and thus a composite score was derived. We
called this measure the drug and gambling composite, and
a higher score indicated more drug and gambling problem
behaviors.
Statistical Analyses
We used a repeated measures design to assess the impact of
length of delay (1 month, 1, 5, 10, and 25 years) and amount
of reward ($100 versus $10000) on temporal discounting
choices. A non-linear regression was conducted to see whether a
hyperbolic function described the data better than an exponential
curve by examining the proportion of variance explained by each.
The non-linear regressions and curve ﬁtting were conducted in
the program GraphPad Prism. Reaction times at indiﬀerence
point and non-indiﬀerence point choices were compared using
non-parametric tests. Correlation analyses were conducted to
determine the associations between temporal discounting,
intelligence, executive functions, thinking dispositions
measures, and our outcome measure. A regression analysis
was conducted to determine whether intelligence, executive
function, and thinking dispositions measures signiﬁcantly
predicted temporal discounting. The indiﬀerence point was
used for the repeated measures and multiple regression analyses
since it was the only normally distributed temporal discounting
measure.
Results
Temporal Discounting: Length of Delay and
Amount of Reward
The dependent measures derived from the temporal discounting
task are displayed in Table 1. All of the temporal discounting
measures have values at diﬀerent delay periods and at reward
magnitudes, except for the k-value which is derived based
on compiling choices from the ﬁve diﬀerent delay periods,
thus resulting in two dependent measures for the k-values.
A multivariate repeated measures analysis was conducted with
the indiﬀerence point scores, with ﬁve levels of length of delay
and two levels of reward magnitude. The analysis indicated
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of length of delay, F(4,95) = 75.66,
p < 0.0001; η2 = 0.76, a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of reward
magnitude, F(1,98) = 614.80, p < 0.0001; η2 = 0.86, and
a signiﬁcant interaction between length of delay and reward
magnitude, F(4,95) = 73.63, p < 0.0001; η2 = 0.76. This
interaction indicates that temporal discounting decreases at
an accelerated rate in the $100 reward magnitude relative
to the $10000 reward magnitude. The same pattern was
apparent with the area under the curve and interest rate
scores. A non-parametric analysis with the Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank test indicated that the k-value for the reward magnitude
of $100 was signiﬁcantly higher than the reward magnitude
for $1000, z = −2.73, p = 0.006. This analysis suggests
that participants were more sensitive to the delay periods at
the $100 reward magnitude compared to the $1000 reward
magnitude.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 728
Basile and Toplak Temporal discounting and individual differences
TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations for temporal discounting dependent measures.
Area under the curve k-value Indifference point Interest rate score2
Delay M SD M SD M SD M SD
$100
1 month <0.01 <0.01 – – 83.23 25.31 0.81 0.28
1 year 0.03 0.01 – – 52.53 32.52 0.57 0.39
5 years 0.07 0.05 – – 33.84 30.40 0.45 0.46
10 years 0.06 0.06 – – 27.17 27.11 0.38 0.47
25 years 0.15 0.15 – – 22.53 24.92 -3 -3
Overall 0.31 0.24 0.26 0.66 43.86 22.23 0.64 0.29
$10,000
1 month <0.01 <0.01 – – 9000.00 1916.63 0.88 0.22
1 year 0.03 0.01 – – 7343.43 2868.41 0.78 0.30
5 years 0.09 0.04 – – 3444.44 3058.02 0.73 0.43
10 years 0.08 0.06 – – 4606.06 3349.74 0.67 0.46
25 years 0.22 0.18 – – 3444.44 3058.02 -3 -3
Overall 0.44 0.27 0.13 0.51 5567.68 2231.63 0.81 0.24
Average 0.37 0.23 0.19 0.50 -1 -1 0.72 0.25
(1) Since these scores would be composed of averaging across different reward magnitudes, they were omitted here. Elsewhere, average indifference points are computed
based on standardized z-scores.
(2) The Interest Rate Score is presented as a percent of points possible.
(3) The Interest Rate Score is based on interest rate returns above 40% annually, at 25 years there was no interest rate that was at this level therefore there is no data
reported.
Temporal Discounting: Hyperbolic versus
Exponential Functions
Non-linear regressions were conducted to determine whether a
hyperbolic equation or an exponential equation best described
the indiﬀerence points plotted against the delay period. Four
non-linear regressions for each participant were completed in
total. There were two reward magnitudes, $100 and $10,000, and
two non-linear regressions, hyperbolic and exponential. In the
$100 reward magnitude, the mean percent of variance accounted
for by the hyperbolic equation was 79.50%, compared to the
mean percent of variance accounted for by the exponential
equation was 73.48%. In the $10,000 rewardmagnitude, the mean
percent of variance accounted for by the hyperbolic equation was
69.90%, compared to the mean percent of variance accounted
for by the exponential equation was 65.61%. Therefore, although
both equations accounted for most of the data, the hyperbolic
function accounted for more of the variance than the exponential
function.
Temporal Discounting Choices Reaction Times
The reaction times for each choice on the temporal discounting
task were divided into reaction times at the indiﬀerence point
and the mean of the reaction times on the choices on the
remaining trials. These reaction times in milliseconds are shown
in Table 2. The reaction times are displayed for each delay
period across each reward magnitude. All of the reaction times
were signiﬁcantly positively skewed, and transformations did
not eliminate the extreme skewness of these variables. Our
key comparisons were the reaction time at the indiﬀerence
point choice compared with the other choices at each reward
level and delay period. Thus, we conducted non-parametric
TABLE 2 | Mean reaction time (milliseconds) at the indifference point and
mean reaction time on non-indifference point temporal discounting
choices.
Delay Indifference point
reaction time (ms)
Mean reaction time without
indifference point (ms)
M SD M SD
$100
1 month 5920.16 5071.23 2775.08 1596.05
1 year 3879.94 5320.22 1776.55 1300.34
5 years 2617.29 2724.40 1249.51 759.14
10 years 2826.95 2914.93 982.03 625.71
25 years 2509.17 2941.91 949.45 862.87
$10000
1 month 3833.71 3989.50 1631.81 1124.76
1 year 3125.90 3706.64 1254.14 949.48
5 years 2400.16 3671.80 1236.76 1009.03
10 years 2740.30 3485.56 1112.30 782.21
25 years 2400.16 3671.80 1068.86 833.56
Average 3225.37 1900.56 1403.65 618.37
analyses that are not impacted by non-normal or skewed
distributions.
A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test revealed statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the response at the indiﬀerence point and the
other responses at each reward level and delay period, ranging
from z = −3.20, p < 0.001 to z = −5.86, p < 0.0001. An
overall mean reaction time score was derived for the indiﬀerence
point choice and the non-indiﬀerence point choices across all
reward levels and delay periods; this analysis also indicated a
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signiﬁcant diﬀerence, z = −8.49, p < 0.0001. Across all of these
analyses, participants displayed a longer reaction time when they
made their choice on the indiﬀerence point trial than on the
non-indiﬀerence point trials.
Associations between Temporal Discounting
Dependent Measures, Intelligence, Executive
Functions, Dispositions, and the Drug and
Gambling Composite
Table 3 displays the correlations between the four total
temporal discounting dependent measures, reaction time at the
indiﬀerence point on the temporal discounting task, intelligence,
executive functions, dispositions, and the drug and gambling
composite. As the k-value, area under the curve, interest rate total
score, and the drug and gambling composite were signiﬁcantly
skewed, non-parametric Spearman’s Rank Order correlations
were used for these measures in the analyses. All of the diﬀerent
temporal discounting dependent measures were signiﬁcantly
intercorrelated, with correlations ranging from −0.75, p< 0.0001
to 0.96, p < 0.0001. The correlations with the k-value are
negative because large k-values represent more discounting and a
preference for immediate smaller reward, which is in the opposite
direction of the other temporal discounting measures. Therefore,
the more sensitivity to delay, the higher the k-value and the lower
the area under the curve, indiﬀerence point, and interest rate
score values.
All four temporal discounting measures were consistently
signiﬁcantly associated with intelligence, in the expected
direction (ranging from r = 0.27, p < 0.01 to r = −0.30,
p < 0.001). The indiﬀerence point, area under the curve, and
interest rate score were signiﬁcantly associated with the executive
function composite also in the expected direction, ranging from
r= 0.22, p< 0.05 to r= 0.27, p< 0.013. TheCFCwas signiﬁcantly
3We compared the correlation coeﬃcients separately for each of the executive
function variables. All of the patterns were in the same direction: higher working
associated with all four temporal discounting measures (ranging
from r = −0.32, p < 0.01 to r = 0.33, p < 0.01). Only
one signiﬁcant association between temporal discounting and
the Need for Cognition Scale was obtained with the k-value.
The choice to wait for a larger delayed reward was associated
with higher intelligence, better executive functions, and more
CFCs.
The indiﬀerence point was signiﬁcantly associated with the
drug and gambling composite, r = −0.21, p < 0.05. The other
associations between the temporal discounting measures and the
outcome variable were in the expected direction, but did not
reach statistical signiﬁcance. Overall, the choice to wait for the
larger delayed reward was associated with less substance use and
less gambling behavior.
The mean reaction time at the indiﬀerence point across all
reward levels and delays was signiﬁcantly associated with the
k-value in the expected direction, but not with any of the other
temporal discounting dependent measures. Then, this reaction
time measure was signiﬁcantly associated with some of the
individual diﬀerence variables, including intelligence, CFCs, and
need for cognition. Longer reaction times were associated with
higher intellectual abilities, more CFCs, and higher persistence in
thinking.
memory, inhibition, and set-shifting were associated with higher indiﬀerence
points, area under the curve, and interest rate total score, and lower k-values. None
of the correlations diﬀered signiﬁcantly across the diﬀerent executive function tasks
(range of correlation for the indiﬀerence point, area under the curve and interest
rate total score: working memory: r = 0.19, p < 0.10 to 0.23, p < 0.05; inhibition
r = 0.12, ns to 0.17, ns; set-shifting: r = 0.16, ns to 0.20, p < 0.05; Correlations for
k-value: working memory: r = −0.061, ns; inhibition r = −0.16, ns; set-shifting:
r = −0.11, ns). We conducted the same set of analyses separately with verbal
and nonverbal abilities, and found the same pattern (range of correlations for the
indiﬀerence point, area under the curve and interest rate total score: verbal ability:
r = 0.14, ns to 0.16, ns; nonverbal ability: r = 0.26, p < 0.01 to 0.28, p < 0.001;
Correlations for k-value: verbal ability: r = −0.10, ns; nonverbal ability: r = −0.32,
p < 0.001).
TABLE 3 | Correlations between temporal discounting dependent measures, cognitive abilities, dispositions, and outcome variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Temporal discounting
(1) Indifference point 1
(2) Area under the curve1 0.96∗∗∗ 1
(3) k-value1 −0.77∗∗ −0.81∗∗∗ 1
(4) Interest rate percent score1 0.93∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗ 1
(5) Reaction time at switch point 0.09 0.15 −0.23∗ 0.06 1
Cognitive ability
(6) Intelligence composite z-score 0.27∗∗ 0.29∗∗ −0.30∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.24∗ 1
(7) Executive function composite z-score 0.22∗ 0.27∗∗ −0.18 0.27∗∗ 0.07 0.45∗∗∗ 1
Thinking dispositions
(8) Consideration of future consequences total score 0.31∗∗ 0.33∗∗ −0.32∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.13 1
(9) Need for cognition total score 0.14 0.15 −0.24∗ 0.19 0.25∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 1
Outcome
(10) Drug and gambling composite1 −0.21∗ −0.16 0.10 −0.18 −0.03 −0.11 −0.14 −0.11 −0.13 1
1Spearman’s Rank Order correlations were used with the area under the curve, k-value, interest rate percent score, drug, and gambling composite measures as they
were highly skewed.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting
Temporal Discounting
Given the correlation analyses presented in Table 3, it is clear
that intelligence, executive function, and CFCs all account for
a signiﬁcant amount of variance in the indiﬀerence point score,
r2 = 0.07, 0.05, and 0.10 respectively. Since executive function,
intelligence and CFCs are somewhat intercorrelated, we wanted
to determine how much of the variance was accounted for in
the indiﬀerence point while controlling for the other predictors.
Speciﬁcally, we wanted to examine the linear combination of
intelligence and executive function in predicting the indiﬀerence
point, and we also wanted to examine whether the inclusion of
CFCs explained a signiﬁcant amount of variance over and above
that accounted for by intelligence and executive functions. The
results of this hierarchical regression are presented in Table 4.
The hierarchical regression was estimated using ordinary least
squares regression.
The linear combination of intelligence and executive
function contained in Model 1 accounted for a signiﬁcant
amount of variance in the indiﬀerence point. Controlling for
executive function, intelligence was a signiﬁcant predictor of
the indiﬀerence point, however, controlling for intelligence,
executive function was no longer a signiﬁcant predictor in
the model. This ﬁnding tells us that intelligence and executive
function share a large amount of variance in the predictor
variable and therefore when both variables are added to the
regression model, only intelligence explains a signiﬁcant amount
of variance over and above that shared with executive function.
Next, the CFCs scale was included in Model 2. Indeed,
the linear combination of variables in Model 2 accounted
for a signiﬁcant amount of variance in the indiﬀerence
point. Controlling for the other variables, the CFCs scale
was signiﬁcantly related to temporal discounting, such that
participants with more CFCs were more willing to wait for
delayed reward. Controlling for executive function and the CFCs
scale rendered intelligence a non-signiﬁcant predictor in this
model. Controlling for intelligence and the CFCs scale left
TABLE 4 | Hierarchical regression analyses of the indifference point
predicted by two models.
Variable B SE(B) 95% CI t(df) sr2
Model 1
Intelligence composite
z-score
0.10 0.05 0.00, 0.20 1.98 (96)∗ 0.04
Executive functions
composite z-score
0.04 0.03 −0.03, 0.11 1.72 (96) 0.01
Model 2
Executive functions
composite z-score
0.05 0.06 −0.06, 0.16 0.88 (95) 0.01
Intelligence composite
z-score
0.05 0.03 −0.02, 0.11 1.37 (95) 0.02
Consideration of future
consequences total score
0.02 0.01 0.00, 0.04 2.36 (95)∗ 0.05
∗p < 0.05.
R2 for Model 1 = 0.09, F (2,96) = 4.6, p = 0.01, R2 for Model 2 = 0.05,
F (1,95) = 5.58, p = 0.02.
executive functions non-signiﬁcant in this model. Regression
Model 2 also predicted a signiﬁcant amount of variance in the
indiﬀerence point over and above the variance accounted for by
Model 1 and thus the inclusion of the CFCs provided a better
model.
Discussion
All of the temporal discounting measures (area under the curve,
k-value, indiﬀerence point, and interest rate total score) were
signiﬁcantly correlated with one another and the preference to
wait for a larger later reward was consistently associated with
higher intelligence, executive functions, and more CFCs. We also
found a magnitude eﬀect, such that higher reward magnitudes
were associated with less temporal discounting. There was also
an interaction between delay period and amount of reward,
suggesting accelerated temporal discounting for lower amounts.
We found these magnitude and delay eﬀects for the indiﬀerence
point, and similar patterns were apparent for the area under
the curve and the interest rate total score measures. When we
examined the curve of the function created by the temporal
discounting data, we found that a hyperbolic equation described
the data better than an exponential equation. Moreover, when
making the temporal discounting choices, participants had
signiﬁcantly longer reaction times on the indiﬀerence point
choice than on all of the other choices. The indiﬀerence
point, in particular, was signiﬁcantly associated with alcohol,
drug, and gambling problems. Finally, hierarchical regression
of intelligence, executive functions, and CFCs signiﬁcantly
predicted temporal discounting choices on the indiﬀerence point
dependent measure.
Assessing Temporal Discounting using a
Single Indicator
The changes in temporal discounting that occur over time
and across reward magnitudes were replicated in the present
research ﬁndings. As delay increased, people preferred the more
immediate reward as opposed to the larger delayed reward. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the ﬁnding that the amount of the
immediate reward that is subjectively equivalent to the delayed
reward, decreased with delay (Green et al., 1997; Steinberg et al.,
2009). There were also signiﬁcant diﬀerences between each of
the $100 and $10,000 magnitude reward blocks. There was less
discounting of the delayed reward in the $10,000 block even
though the amount of the immediate and delayed reward was
proportional to that in the $100 block. Green et al. (1997) found
that the rate of discounting of the delayed reward decreased in
a negatively accelerating fashion from $100 to $25,000 reward
magnitude blocks. Thus, as the reward magnitude increased,
people were more likely to wait for delayed reward.
The indiﬀerence points were ﬁt with non-linear regressions
to both hyperbolic and exponential discounting functions. The
hyperbolic discounting function accounted for more variance
in the indiﬀerence point or subjective value as predicted from
delay than did the exponential function. This is consistent with
a body of research that has compared hyperbolic discounting
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functions to exponential ones, and has found that even though
both models predict a large amount of variance in the indiﬀerence
point or subjective value of the delayed reward, a hyperbolic
function accounts for slightly more variance and is therefore a
better model (Rachlin et al., 1991; Green et al., 1997; Johnson
and Bickel, 2002; Myerson et al., 2003; Robles and Vargas, 2007;
Steinberg et al., 2009).
We examined a further index to assess temporal discounting
choices, called the interest rate total score. This measure
demonstrated the same convergent patterns as the k-value, area
under the curve, and indiﬀerence points. The purpose of this
measure was to select a subset of items where participants should
prefer the delayed option, where the expected utility is arguably
better if one waits, making this measure a better indicator of
decision-making performance. However, this measure was also
skewed, similar to the k-value and area under the curve. The
skewed distribution of the interest rate score was, however,
diﬀerent from the skewed distribution of the k-value and area
under the curve measures. The k-value and area under the curve
measures were positively skewed, reﬂecting a sudden hyperbolic
decrease in discounting over delay period. Alternatively, the
interest rate total score had a negative skew, due to the fact
that there was very little variability in some of the temporal
discounting choices on the other side of the distribution. For
example, for the “$10 now” versus “$100 in a month” choice,
three participants chose now and 96 participants chose later
demonstrating that virtually all of the participants preferred to
wait for the large amount. This item was a poor discriminator
in our sample, and contributed to the negative skew in the
distribution of the total interest rate score. However, one could
design temporal discounting items with a more narrow range
of discriminating items to further diﬀerentiate better judgments
and choices and to derive a normally distributed measure to
use for further assessments with individual diﬀerence measures.
Overall, our interest rate total score measure performed similarly
to the other temporal discounting indicators, including a similar
pattern of associations with our individual diﬀerence measures.
The basis of this measure is to diﬀerentiate poor from good
choices based on an interest rate cut-oﬀ score. Thus, the interest
rate total score will be a useful indicator to assess temporal
discounting as a measure of rational thinking and decision-
making competence (Toplak et al., 2014).
The temporal discounting task was assessedwith four diﬀerent
dependent measures; indiﬀerence point, area under the curve,
k-values, and an interest rate total score. The correlations ranged
from 0.75, p < 0.0001 to 0.96, p < 0.0001 suggesting that these
variables are largely redundant and may serve as proxies for
one another. All of these dependent measures were signiﬁcantly
and strongly associated with each other. Since these measures
are highly associated, it is acceptable to interpret results from
the measures in similar ways. Myerson et al. (2001) suggested
that the area under the curve be used instead of the k-value
as an index of discounting since the k-value has theoretical
assumptions based on the line of best ﬁt from the non-
linear regression using the hyperbolic function. Another major
diﬀerence between these measures is that only the indiﬀerence
point measure was normally distributed and not skewed, making
it a good candidate for studies examining associations with other
individual diﬀerence measures using parametric models.
The Selection of the Larger Delayed Reward is
the Considered Choice
In addition to the pattern of ﬁndings obtained with respect to
delay period and reward magnitude, our analyses examining
reaction time diﬀerences, associations with cognitive abilities and
executive functions, and associations with thinking dispositions
provides further insights into the correlates of temporal
discounting choices.
Our results indicated that the reaction time during the trial
in which the participant shifted from choosing the “amount
now” to choosing the “amount later,” the indiﬀerence point,
was signiﬁcantly higher than the reaction times for the other
trials. These results indicate that participants spent longer on
the indiﬀerence point trial than on all of the other trials. This is
consistent with research that has found that reaction times seem
to parallel the eﬀort involved in making temporal discounting
choices (Robles and Vargas, 2007). This research has found a
bimodal distribution in reaction times with people taking longer
on the ﬁrst choice and at the indiﬀerence point. The results in the
current study conﬁrm that people do take signiﬁcantly longer at
the indiﬀerence point which may be due to the eﬀort involved in
overriding the default choice from the previous responses, when
participants are deciding when the delayed reward is subjectively
equivalent to the immediate reward. The reaction time at the
indiﬀerence point was also signiﬁcantly correlated with some of
the individual diﬀerence variables, including intellectual abilities,
CFCs, and persistence in thinking, reinforcing that the choice
at the indiﬀerence point was more cognitively eﬀortful than the
other choices in the task.
The association between temporal discounting and cognitive
ability measures are consistent with the ﬁnding that people
with higher intelligence scores have lower rates of temporal
discounting or show less discounting of future reward due to
time (Shamosh and Gray, 2008; Shamosh et al., 2008). For
people with higher intelligence scores, the amount of a delayed
reward maintains its value, and these people are willing to wait
for the delayed reward as opposed to preferring the immediate
smaller reward. The relationship between the executive function
composite z-score and the temporal discounting dependent
measures was very similar, and consistent with the literature
that has demonstrated a relationship with cognitive abilities
(Thorell, 2007; Shamosh et al., 2008; Sjöwall et al., 2013). As
the overall temporal discounting indiﬀerence point increased,
CFCs increased, but no relationship was obtained with the
Need for Cognition Scale. This reﬂects the ﬁnding that the
more individuals consider distant outcomes when choosing their
present behavior (Strathman et al., 1994) the more likely they
are to wait for delayed reward. This parallels research that has
found the same relationship between future orientation and delay
discounting (Steinberg et al., 2009).
We expected that those who endorse more persistence in
abstract thinking would also be more likely to wait for a
larger delayed reward, as both involve engagement in analytic
thought and consideration, but this was not the case on the
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temporal discounting dependent measures. The one exception
was that reaction time at the indiﬀerence point was signiﬁcantly
correlated with the Need for Cognition Scale, suggesting that
actual time spent on the trial requiring the most consideration
was perhaps the critical variable to explain this association.
Prudently discounting the future and persistence in thinking may
not necessarily cohere together. To our knowledge, the need for
cognition scale had not been examined with respect to temporal
discounting in previous literature, thus we were less surprised
that this association was not signiﬁcant.
Our regression analyses indicated that a model including
intelligence, executive functions, and CFCs was a signiﬁcant
predictor of the indiﬀerence point dependent measure. While
executive functions, intelligence, and CFCs were signiﬁcantly
associated with temporal discounting independently, when
entered into the hierarchical regression, a model including CFCs
explained the most amount of variance in the indiﬀerence point
score. These ﬁndings are consistent with Shamosh et al. (2008)
who also found that some executive functions, such as working
memory, did not explain further variance than was explained by
intelligence. This suggests that the predictive power attributed
to intelligence and executive functions, both cognitive abilities,
may be assessing processing capacities and processing eﬃciency
(Stanovich, 2009). Since CFCs was a signiﬁcant predictor in our
model, this ﬁnding suggests that thinking dispositions factor
strongly into temporal discounting choices, namely general
preferences toward satisfying immediate needs versus regard
for the future and distant outcomes. These ﬁndings reinforce
that temporal discounting choices involve processing eﬃciencies
and capacities (intelligence and executive functions) as well as
dispositional tendencies that shape temporal discounting choices.
Ainslie (2001) has suggested that utility theory is inadequate for
explaining temporal discounting choices, as it is not just a matter
of calculating themaximal reward. In fact, our regression analyses
suggest that there is shared variance between cognitive abilities
and CFCs that is predicting temporal discounting choices. The
ﬁndings in this study demonstrate that the selection of the larger
delayed reward reﬂects more eﬀortful, considered processing
and a resistance to miserly information processing, and thus,
is a relevant measure for taxonomies of rational thinking and
decision-making (Stanovich, 2009, 2011).
Associations between Temporal Discounting
and Real World Behavioral Correlates
The temporal discounting choices were only modestly correlated
with the problem reporting drug, alcohol, and gambling
composite measure, with only the indiﬀerence point reaching
signiﬁcance. This is generally in line with other studies that have
shown high rates of discounting to be associated with substance
use (Bickel and Marsch, 2001) and pathological gambling (Holt
et al., 2003). The modesty of our associations may be partly
attributable to the fact that these risky behaviors were endorsed
with low frequency in the present sample of university students.
Other future directions include replication of the current ﬁndings
with larger sample sizes.
Conclusion
The current study replicated ﬁndings that temporal discounting
increased as delay to reward increased, and temporal discounting
decreased as reward magnitude increased. We found the
same pattern of eﬀects between four indicators of temporal
discounting, and consistent relationships with individual
diﬀerence measures, including intelligence, executive functions,
and the dispositional tendency of CFCs. The preferred choice
to wait for a larger, later reward is associated with higher
intellectual abilities and executive functions and the tendency
to give more consideration to future consequences. The reaction
time diﬀerences indicated that it took longer to make choices
at the indiﬀerence point than at the other choice points. The
interest rate total score measure was a converging measure of
temporal discounting that may provide an additional index to
assess decision-making choices in future studies. It will be fruitful
to further develop such measures that separate better choices
from poor choices to help identify and ameliorate failures in
temporal discounting judgments that may contribute to poor
outcomes.
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